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understanding Africa today
Zimbabwe’s 2012 census report suggests that notable de-urbanisation 
occurred between 2002 and 2012. Some external commentators 
have cited urban–rural migration and the Fast Track Land Reform 
Programme – jambanja – initiated in 2000 as the principal drivers of this 
phenomenon. During field research in the second half of 2016, I found 
that ordinary citizens and key informants – in politics, government 
and civil society – expressed bewilderment at suggestions that the 
country is de-urbanising. While the populations of the large cities 
appear to be growing slowly, if at all, unadjusted boundaries mean that 
the demographic growth associated with urban sprawl has not been 
captured. In-depth analysis also reveals rapid population growth in 
peri-urban areas that should be designated as urban, and in small and 
intermediate urban settlements.
Overestimation of the urban populations, and the rate at which 
urbanisation levels are increasing in African countries, is a consistent 
feature of international organisation reports.1 But for Zimbabwe, 
underestimation seems to have occurred. While the rate of urbanisation 
may have slowed, the extent of the slowdown appears exaggerated 
and it is likely to be reversed when boundary changes are made. It is 
not inconceivable that Zimbabwe could still be majority urban by 2050.
By Beacon Mbiba
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Africa’s “rapid urbanisation” is controversial. In a provocatively 
titled 2010 Counterpoint, “Whatever happened to Africa’s rapid 
urbanisation?”, and elsewhere, Deborah Potts has provided irrefutable 
evidence that it is a flawed generalisation.2  In a significant number of 
countries the urbanisation level – the percentage of the population 
living in urban areas – has declined since the 1990s due to economic 
crises, de-industrialisation, epidemics or other causes. Furthermore, 
notable within- and between-country variations prevail. 
Potts has shown convincingly that, despite abundant examples 
of countries experiencing rapid urban population growth but 
only gradual increases – or declines – in their overall urbanisation 
level, promotion of the “rapid urbanisation” narrative continues 
unabated. Flagship reports from leading international agencies 
including the World Bank and UN-Habitat have been slow to fully 
take this research data on board or have done so grudgingly. Most 
recently, the 2016 edition of the authoritative African Economic 
Outlook asserted that “Africa is urbanising at a historically rapid 
rate, bringing considerable opportunities and challenges”.3  
Clearly, Africa’s urban population is increasing in absolute terms 
– in many countries, rapidly. Contention arises, in part, due to 
confusion of terms. “Urban growth” is equated to “urbanisation”, 
but there is an important distinction to bear in mind. Urban growth 
is the increase in urban population that occurs as a result of any 
or a combination of rural–urban migration, natural increase, 
boundary changes or reclassification of rural villages or territories 
into urban areas. Urbanisation occurs when population growth in 
urban areas exceeds that of the total national population. If urban 
and rural populations are growing at the same rate, urban growth 
is occurring, but not urbanisation. The distinction is about more 
than semantics: a decline in the proportion of the total population 
living in towns and urban settlements, signifying counter- or de-
urbanisation, has important policy implications that should not be 
overlooked.
To its credit, in the State of African Cities 2014 report, and more 
forcefully in the Habitat III Regional Report for Africa, UN-Habitat 
accepted that urban population growth rates relative to national 
population growth rates are stagnant or very slow in many countries 
and regional variations are the norm. Furthermore, the average 
rate of urbanisation in 1990–2015 was below 2% for the majority 
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of countries (see Figure 1). Despite saying that Africa is urbanising 
at a rapid rate, African Economic Outlook 2016 presents data for 
selected countries where only three – Burkina Faso, Cameroon and 
Tanzania – are categorised as having rapidly urbanised between 
1980 and 2012. Seven are presented as typical of slow urbanisation 
of below 2% between censuses, while another five are presented 
as de-urbanising.4  Zimbabwe, together with Zambia, Mali, Côte 
d’Ivoire and Central African Republic, is one of the countries flagged 
as experiencing de-urbanisation; and it features prominently in 
analyses of de-urbanisation in the 1990s.5 
While accepting Potts’s exhortation to be wary of urban statistics 
and sceptical of the rapid urbanisation narrative, this Counterpoint 
urges that the pendulum should not swing completely to the 
other extreme. Rigorous analysis of evidence cited in support 
of de-urbanisation is also required. In the case of Zimbabwe, 
the de-urbanisation apparent in headline census figures since 
the 1990s seems to be exaggerated. De-urbanisation is not 
necessarily permanent – it can be reversed. Furthermore, although 
demographic and spatial conceptions of urbanisation are central 
to this discussion, it must be remembered that urbanisation also 
has economic, socio-cultural, political, infrastructural and services 
dimensions.
Zimbabwe – the headline figures
Zimbabwe’s most recent census, conducted in 2012, found that 
the share of the urban population had declined from 35% of the 
total population in 2002 to 33%, indicating that the country had 
de-urbanised during the decade. Unlike other African countries 
where censuses have been erratic, or their results highly contested, 
Zimbabwe has conducted regular, credible censuses involving and 
endorsed by leading UN and other donor agencies. It is a data-rich 
country, although access to the disaggregated local area data has 
been difficult in recent years and extrapolation is sometimes required. 
The headline figures have certainly attracted attention. During field 
research in the second half of 2016, I found that ordinary citizens 
and my key informants expressed bewilderment at suggestions 
that Zimbabwe is de-urbanising. In seeking an explanation for why 
the country should have seemingly experienced de-urbanisation, 
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Figure 1: Real urbanisation growth rates in Africa, 1990 – 2015
Source: Plotted by author using data from UN DESA World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision
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the Mo Ibrahim Foundation stated that it had been “driven by 
urban–rural migration” and that “a growing share of the population 
living in communal land and resettlement areas [suggested] de-
urbanisation is being driven by the land resettlement programme”.6 
The causal link between the Government of Zimbabwe’s Fast 
Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) – or jambanja – and de-
urbanisation needs careful interrogation. De-urbanisation was 
also observed in the previous intercensal period in the 1990s, long 
before jambanja. The reasons cited then included urban economic 
decline, household responses to HIV/AIDS, and the collapse of urban 
services, with retrenched workers and the terminally ill retreating 
to rural areas.7  Jambanja and its socio-economic consequences 
remain highly contested, and their impact on urbanisation poorly 
understood. Whether Zimbabwe is really de-urbanising and, if so, 
to what extent jambanja has contributed to the process will require 
deeper investigation. 
Urban Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe’s national settlement framework has a seven-tier 
hierarchy of human settlements comprising metropolitan areas 
(Harare and Bulawayo), cities or municipalities, towns, and as many 
as 472 small urban centres in the form of “growth points”, district 
service centres and rural service centres. The official definition 
of an urban area in Zimbabwe is based on a combination of two 
criteria: namely a settlement designated as urban; and a compact 
settlement of 2,500 people or more, the majority of whom are 
employed in non-farm employment.8  Given the rural location of 
district and rural service centres, the Zimbabwe National Statistics 
Agency (ZIMSTAT) categorises them as rural even if their population 
is above the 2,500 threshold – unless they have been reclassified 
as urban/towns, as was recently the case with Gokwe and Gutu 
Mupandawana. Similarly, among my key informants flummoxed by 
the suggestion that Zimbabwe is de-urbanising, the perception of 
“urban” excluded these small urban settlements.
In 2002, Zimbabwe had an urban population of 4,029,707 which 
grew by 6.31% to 4,284,145 in 2012, an increase of 0.63% per year. 
Unlike the 2002 census report, the 2012 report has no chapter 
devoted to urban population and migration data. As with all 
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censuses, some discrepancies and anomalies are apparent. For 
example, it states that the urban population of Zimbabwe was 
4,284,145;9  but if one adds the totals in each province for the 
“Urban Council Area population” plus “Growth Points and other 
Areas”, the total comes to 4,261,243.10  More significant is the 
information, based on the above-mentioned additions, that the 
urban population for Mashonaland Central Province is 71,332. This 
is a substantial decrease from the figure of 102,873 in the 2002 
census report.11  Enquiries with ZIMSTAT indicate that these are 
discrepancies for which they have not found an explanation. Why 
should Mashonaland Central Province’s urban population decline 
to this extent considering that this is the same region in which 
towns like Mvurwi are reportedly booming?12 
Such anomalies aside, it is clear that the census totals signify 
quite slow growth in the number of urban dwellers. Between 2002 
and 2012, the rural population increased by 15.46% compared 
to 6.31% for urban areas. A comparison of distribution of urban 
populations by province also shows minor changes between 2002 
and 2012. There was a slight decline in Bulawayo’s share; and 
Harare accounted for 47% of the national urban population in 2012 
(35% if Epworth and Chitungwiza are separated out), versus 46% in 
2002 (36% if Epworth and Chitungwiza are separated out). In other 
words, according to these data the primacy of the capital, including 
its peri-urban satellite urban areas, increased slightly during the 
decade. The intercensal population change for the major urban 
areas is displayed in Figure 2, and for the provinces in Figure 3. 
The difference between the growth rates of rural and urban 
populations can in part be attributed to higher total fertility rates 
in rural areas compared to urban areas. Total fertility rates of 2.8 
for Bulawayo and 3.1 for Harare are much lower than the range of 
3.6–4.3 for the other provinces.13  However, as the base population 
is large in the main cities, lower natural increase rates still result in 
significant aggregate population growth before we take migration 
into account. 
Two further factors also need to be considered when analysing 
the urban population data: national and international migration 
patterns, and the impact of boundary changes or rigidity, addressed 
in more detail later. Although the census report states that internal 
migration patterns between the 2002 and 2012 censuses should 
6
Figure 2: Population growth in Zimbabwe’s towns and cities, 2002 – 2012
Source: plotted by author using data from ZIMSTAT 2002 and 2012 census reports
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160
Bulawayo
Kadoma
Harare
Victoria Falls
Hwange Urban
Kwekwe
Mutare
Chitungwiza
Redcliff
Gweru Urban
Kariba Urban
Chegutu Urban
Plumtree
Chiredzi Urban
Marondera
Masvingo Urban
Karoi
Zvishavane Urban
Bindura
Shurugwi Urban
Mvurwi
Rusape
Gokwe Centre
Epwoth
Norton
Chipinge
Gwanda Urban
Chinhoyi
Beitbridge Urban 
Ruwa Local Board
EPWORTH
CHITUNGWIZA
GOKWE
MUPANDAWANA
MVURWI
GOROMOZI
RUWANORTON
KOTWA
BEITBRIDGE
PLUMTREE
NGUNDUMASVINGO
CHINHOYI
GWANDA
CHIPINGE
KWEKWE
REDCLIFF
GWERU
HWANGE CHEGUTU
KAROI
KARIBA
BINDURA
BULAWAYO
HARARE
ZVISHAVANE
CHIREDZI
RUSAPE
MUTARE
SHURUGWI
% intercensal population change
7
be treated with caution as some provinces changed boundaries, 
some headline migration figures need mentioning. Zimbabwe 
has ten provinces including the urban provinces of Harare and 
Bulawayo. Lifetime interprovincial migration data show that Harare 
and Bulawayo “exhibited the highest in-migration rates” of 49% 
each, that is to say the percentage of people born outside these 
two urban provinces but resident there on census day. The report 
states that Harare was “the largest net gainer of population” 
from net migration, which accounted for 21% of its population 
on census day.14 Furthermore, Harare and Bulawayo exhibited the 
highest intercensal in-migration rate of slightly over 30%15  and 
net migration rates of 5.12% and 4.18% respectively, compared to 
negative net migration rates for five of the ten provinces.16  These 
statistics on internal intercensal migration do not attest to large-
scale urban–rural migration.
Finally, therefore, it is important to recognise that although Zimbabwe’s 
demographic urbanisation rate may not be increasing, there is 
absolute urban population growth. As I will illustrate later in this 
Counterpoint, there is also significant urban spatial growth. 
Local level population dynamics: growth and mobility 
Although the census data on urbanisation and migration data are 
patchy, comparison of 2002 and 2012 urban statistics provides 
important insights on local-level changes. Figure 2 shows that except 
for Harare and a few other centres whose growth rates are low or 
even negative – as is the case for Bulawayo – there has been rapid 
population growth in small urban centres and peri-urban zones. On 
the face of it, while these figures fit global trends that show declining 
rates of urban growth as economies mature, on closer inspection 
the Zimbabwe story is more complex. This is where jambanja needs 
to be considered. 
The initial impact of Zimbabwe’s violent land reform was internal 
displacement of thousands of former commercial farm workers, 
the majority of whom became homeless and sought shelter and 
livelihoods in urban and peri-urban areas.17  This process unfolded 
both before and after the 2002 census. But then came the “tsunami”, 
the military-style Operation Murambatsvina (“he/she who despises 
filth”) in 2005, during which the state destroyed houses and small 
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Source: plotted by author using data from ZIMSTATS 2002 and 2012 census reports
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Figure 3: Population growth in Zimbabwe by province, 2002 – 2012
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enterprises deemed illegal. Hundreds of thousands of urban and rural 
households were affected. The epicentre of these clearances was in 
low-income urban and peri-urban areas where most of those internally 
displaced by jambanja were sheltering. Thus jambanja and rural 
resettlement in some respects led initially to rural depopulation and 
urban growth, which Operation Murambatsvina partially reversed.
The deepening socio-economic crisis also led to increased mobility, 
as households sought to spread risks and maximise their chances of 
survival by operating in multiple geographical and economic zones. 
By 2004, most urban households – irrespective of political persuasion 
– had secured plots within 100km of their urban homes where they 
would travel periodically or have some family members resident to 
grow crops and increase their food security. Those in rural communal 
areas also made similar decisions for multi-sited livelihoods without 
necessarily abandoning their old homes.18  This mobility and circularity 
– individuals and families moving in and out of rural and urban areas 
and circulating between different locations mainly to pursue informal 
economic activity – must not be underestimated. A census only 
records where individuals are on the night of the census.
Jambanja and a housing stampede
The acute shortage of urban housing in Zimbabwe is well documented 
and widely acknowledged.19 High levels of overcrowding in existing 
stock, coupled with the government’s brutal restriction of squatter 
settlements, maintained the quintessentially European physical 
appearance of Zimbabwe’s urban areas for a long time after 
independence in 1980. All this collapsed with jambanja, as ZANU-PF 
elites used peri-urban land allocations to reward their supporters. 
The mechanisms of this patronage system took a variety of forms 
including politically aligned co-operatives. With jambanja, the bulk 
of peri-urban land that used to be privately owned farms became 
state land and legal obstacles to converting this land from rural to 
urban use were removed.
Initially, the majority of urban residents were hesitant about lining up 
for this land, but by 2010 a “stampede” was underway. A plethora 
of land dealers emerged who grabbed and allocated sites and/or 
plots for housing development.20  These included political elites, 
corrupt government officials and professionals, self-made land 
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barons, churches and traditional leaders in peri-urban areas. Private 
land owners cashed in by subdividing their plots for sale. Villagers 
converted agricultural land to residential use to accommodate urban 
dwellers on a rental basis. In the process they also fenced off adjacent 
public land; for example, grazing land in Seke, Goromonzi and 
Domboshawa rural areas in peri-urban Harare, in a process popularly 
known as Operation Garawadya (“eat first then questions later”). 
These developments cumulatively led to the rapid growth of 
small towns and satellite towns around Harare such as Ruwa and 
Norton, as well as the peri-urban areas of Seke and Domboshawa. 
Simultaneously, increasing mobility, informality and the rise of 
a trader society reinforced the growth of border towns including 
Kotwa, Beitbridge and Plumtree; and highway settlements, 
most of them small rural service centres such as Ngundu and 
Mhandamabgwe (both in Chivi District, on routes to South Africa). 
In seeking to understand the dynamics of Zimbabwe’s urban 
development, the government’s response to the expanding 
urban sprawl throughout the country must also be considered. 
It has conspicuously not unleashed an operation similar to 
Murambatsvina. Instead, demolitions have been small-scale and 
targeted.21  At the same time, there has been an overhaul of the land 
and development regulations typified by the urban housing policy. 
Housing space standards have been reduced from a minimum plot 
size of 300m2 to as low as 100m2.22  With government and local 
authorities bankrupt, the development process has been opened 
up to anyone who appears to have the means to participate.
Crucially, houses can now be developed even where there is 
no approved land-use layout plan, no cadastral surveys and 
no infrastructure. All these factors have contributed to urban 
spatial growth in rural areas. They have also contributed to de-
urbanisation in the sense of loss of urban character, namely, growth 
of urban areas lacking the infrastructure, services and institutions 
Zimbabweans would normally expect.
Boundary games
In a 2012 paper challenging myths of urban dynamics in sub-
Saharan Africa, Potts underlined that much of the addition of large 
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numbers of people to urban populations each year “appears to 
be increasingly derived from rural settlements being redefined as 
‘urban’ having passed a definitional population threshold”.23  The 
Mo Ibrahim Foundation reported that in Kenya’s 2009 census, the 
re-classification of rural and peri-urban areas as urban led to a 29% 
upsurge in the urban population.24  Zimbabwe’s experience since 
the 1990s, however, has been different.
Instead of boundary changes to incorporate rural villages into 
urban areas, boundaries in Zimbabwe have remained static while 
urban sprawl and urban populations in rural jurisdictions have 
expanded. As a result, the 2012 census did not capture the urban 
demographic growth the spatial expansion has caused. The 
2012 census enumeration tracts were aligned with the Zimbabwe 
Electoral Commission’s 2008 elections boundaries. Other than 
for political expediency, it is not clear why this was necessary; 
ordinarily, statistics from the previous census should drive the 
delimitation of election boundaries not the other way round. The 
fractious politics of the country means that changing boundaries – or 
leaving them unchanged – is more a political issue than a response 
to urgent urban management issues. Decisions are taken with an 
eye to electoral advantages that may accrue. This undermines direct 
comparison of the 2012 census data with those of previous censuses. 
Reviewing the census report indicates that boundary rigidity has led 
to urban populations of many small settlements and undesignated 
urban areas being counted and reported as rural, even though the 
populations of these settlements were above the 2,500 threshold. 
For Harare, as described below, the population counted as rural is in 
the magnitude of hundreds of thousands. 
In land-use and population terms, Figure 4a shows an example of 
the growth of urban populations in areas still designated as rural: 
Caledonia Farm, to the east of Harare. This is an organic growth 
area that now forms a continuation of the existing city. Even after 
a presidential proclamation (Statutory Instrument SI 119/2012) 
declaring the incorporation of Caledonia into Harare municipality, 
the area was still enumerated in the 2012 census as part of rural 
Goromonzi District (Ward 25), with a recorded population of 27,102. 25 
As at September 2016, it was still politically represented as such.
Yet by 2015, it had between 23,000 and 30,000 plots. Assuming an 
average of four people per plot, Caledonia’s population was no less 
than 100,000.26  
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Another example is in Masvingo, where people have been settling 
on Clipsham and Victoria Ranch (see Figure 4b) to the south and 
southwest, respectively, of the city centre. The 2012 census counted 
both areas as part of Masvingo Rural District with Clipsham Farm 
as Ward 8 (population 9,020) and Victoria Ranch Farm as Ward 7 
(population 5,211).27  ZIMSTAT has resisted making available data 
for all the enumeration areas and relevant boundary information 
to enable comprehensive countrywide plotting of urban areas 
counted as rural wards. But the examples of Caledonia, Victoria 
Ranch and Clipsham clearly show that a huge urban population 
was counted as rural in 2012, due to boundaries that had not been 
changed to reflect urban sprawl.
Towards a (majority) urban Zimbabwe?
The FTLRP initiated in 2000 led to rural–urban migration in the short 
term, which Operation Murambatsvina then partially reversed. The 
population of Zimbabwe’s large cities is still growing in aggregate 
terms, albeit the rate of growth may be slowing. Furthermore, 
the 2012 census did not capture the impact of spatial growth on 
the population statistics of these centres; and the urbanisation of 
rural areas is not fully recognised due to boundary rigidity. These 
are part of diverse temporal, regional and local variations that 
contradict the depiction of a generalised trend of de-urbanisation 
in Zimbabwe.
If any de-urbanisation is taking place, it is localised and driven 
by factors linked to historical communal land rights, regional 
and international migration and circulation, droughts, and social 
turbulence arising from state operations and political instability. 
Mobility is a better way to conceptualise the dynamics of 
Zimbabwe’s demographic and political economy, and rural–urban 
dynamics. High levels of mobility and circulation warrant caution 
in jumping to conclusions about Zimbabwe’s rate of urbanisation 
based on recent aggregate population statistics.
The 2013 Constitution has a provision that seeks to establish political 
certainty in the election process and ensure fairer elections through 
regularly making boundary changes to better reflect population 
distribution. Section 161 (1) states that “once every ten years, on 
a date or within a period fixed by the Commission, so as to fall as 
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soon as possible after a population census, The Zimbabwe Electoral 
Commission must conduct a delimitation of the electoral boundaries 
into which Zimbabwe is to be divided”; and in doing so “ensure 
that no ward is divided between two or more local authority areas” 
(Section 161 (5) (a)). Clearly, delimiting local authority boundaries is 
intertwined with electoral and census boundaries. National elections 
are due in 2018 and one can expect that electoral boundaries 
should change to account for both the 2012 census results and any 
submissions various interested parties make.
When, in the near future, boundary changes are made, the urban 
population will show a dramatic increase since the 2012 census. 
Economic recovery would provide a further boost to urban 
investment and attract more rural–urban migrants. It is not 
inconceivable that Zimbabwe could still reach the 50% urbanisation 
level by 2050. Meanwhile, further comprehensive analysis of 
disaggregated socio-spatial census data is needed to enhance the 
understanding of urban transformation in the country.
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 suffering-in-silence/)
27 Email from ZIMSTAT, September 2016
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Figure 4a
Figure 4b
Victoria Ranch Farm Masvingo
Source: Modified Google Maps. Beacon Mbiba, 30 September 2016
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